Showing posts with label RBI Governor. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RBI Governor. Show all posts

Sunday, 18 March 2018

Reticent Urjit Patel turn eloquent



RBI Governor Urjit Patel's silence on demonetization made him an easy target for critics. Almost all public statements on demonetization were made by economic affairs secretary Shaktikanta Das giving rise to the impression that government had sidelined RBI and usurped its policy role, confining it to mere execution. But the Nirav Modi-PNB scam has forced Patel to shun reticence and speak out on several contentious issues without mincing words. 
  • Patel rejected accusations that the regulator’s laxity was to blame for the Rs.13,000-crore fraud at state-owned Punjab National Bank, suggesting that laws need to be changed to ensure punitive action can be taken in time and effectively putting the onus on the government. 
  • He made a pitch for withdrawal of legal immunity from RBI regulations that PSB's enjoy, saying it had led to considerable emaciation of RBI powers over corporate governance. 
  • Patel made an indirect case for privatisation or reducing the role of state-owned lenders. He said the government should decide what to do with public sector banks if it wanted to optimise the use of taxpayer money.
  • He asserted that Banking Regulatory Powers in India are NOT Ownership Neutral. He then went on to read out chapter and verse, the list of clauses and sub-clauses from the legal landscape to underline the helplessness of RBI when it came to regulating public sector banks, which account for nearly 70% of Indian banking.
  • Making this worse is the persistence of delays, of criminal investigation and judicial process. The Governor points out that “RBI data on banking frauds suggests that only a handful of cases over the past five years have had closure, and cases of substantive economic significance remain open. As a result, the overall enforcement mechanism is not perceived to be a major deterrent to frauds relative to economic gains from fraud.”
  • Nearly nine months later – after two rounds of selection meetings – the Deputy Governor’s post is yet vacant.
  • RBI is faced with constraints. It cannot act to remove directors or the management of public sector banks. But does it need the ultimate power to prevent malfeasance? The RBI is empowered to give directions where it is in the public interest. How often has that been deployed? Has the power of inspection been utilised? A call for more power is not a credible demand when existing provisions have not been leveraged.
  • RBI said: “The risks arising from the potential malicious use of the SWIFT infrastructure” has been a risk factor and it had “confidentially cautioned and alerted banks” on three occasions since August 2016 and added, “Banks have, however, been at varying levels in implementation of such measures.” But RBI never cautioned savers about these risks in the banking systems.
  • He said, “If we need to face the brickbats and be the Neelakantha consuming this poison, we will do so as our duty. We will persist with our endeavours and get better with each trial and tribulation along the way." He went on to saying that promoters and banks should seek to be on the side of the devas (the gods) rather than asuras (the demons) in this amrit manthan. 
Despite his image of a reticent, submissive man, Patel withstood pressures from various sides after demonetisation, stuck to a low-inflation regime, didn't lap up the proposal to create a bad bank and opposed farm debt waivers, calling them moral hazards posing inflation risk and undermining an honest credit culture. With his robust defence of the central bank and castigation of public sector banks, Patel has buried the image of a central banker of few words. And with his mythological references, he has shown he can find eloquence when required. 


Responsibility shared by two persons is not 50% each. It is 10% each.

While Bank's proper management rests with the owners (MoF in case PSB's), Urjit Patel, RBI Governor can't resort to offensive in the blame game initiated by Arun Jaitley by invoking mythological comparisons and absolve of its regulatory failures.

Had Urjit Patel shown same courage in 2016, the harebrained demonetization wouldn't have happened and nation would have been spared of its consequences borne mostly by lower class people. These discussions, reasons and advises will be engaging our time and leads to nowhere. While the loot may never get recovered, what is important is elimination of recurrence of such events in future. Urjit Patel must know his responsibility as institutional head never to allow government interference beyond a point and preserve institution's independence and integrity at all costs. Government as owner of PSB's is solely responsible for their proper functioning and the regulatory rules governing PSB's and private banks must be same. RBI's regulatory role in preserving depositors & lenders interests and integrity of banking system can not be compromised.


Sunday, 18 February 2018

Riskless capitalism leads to NPAs, in India

"Riskless capitalism" is a term first used by Raghuram Rajan in November 2014. The Indian growth story cannot be over-simplistically explained as a result of "market-oriented" reforms. Public sector bank credit-financed investments, particularly in the infrastructure sector, played a significant role in sustaining growth, most crucially after the global economic crisis. Such a growth trajectory, however, proved to be unsustainable with the expansionary phase coming to an end in 2011-12 and bad loans piling up in the banking system.


STYLIZED FACTS
  • The Indian economy saw a boom between 2003-08 and a bust in 2008-09 whereas the second boom was for two years between 2009-11 followed by a decline.
  • Private corporate investment grew faster than public investment during the booms increased from 6.5% to 10.3%.
  • Credit from the public sector banks reached high levels during both the boom periods and a decline in between the two booms during 2008-09. Credit flow from the private sector banks did not follow this trend.
  • By the time of the second boom, the banks were recklessly lending to already highly indebted companies.
  • In the first boom, the real interest rates fell from 12% to 2.5%. In the second boom real rate of interest was increased.
  • The fiscal deficit was reduced drastically during the first boom period. A “pause” button was pushed following the global recession and the fiscal deficit expanded from 2008-09.
  • Import intensity of the Indian economy has been steadily rising in the high growth phase and continues to rise today.


GROWTH MODEL
  • The internal constraint is the rate of profit should at least be equal to the interest accrued on the debt taken in the past. The external constraint is the Gross External Financing Requirements (GEFR) should be equal to net capital inflows and change in foreign exchange reserves.
  • These two constraints are the boundaries for the economic system to function well where neither the domestic financial sector comes under severe strain nor the economy is faced with a balance of payment crisis.
  • A developing country faces a foreign exchange constraint arising out of the current account needs as well as the international debt servicing payments accrued in the past.
  • Investment decision of a private firm is aggregated to  - first, how much of investment is to be undertaken? Second, how is this investment going to be financed?
  • The state-owned banks were made to relax their risk function. And the risk-taking of private investment, was passed on to the public sector banks. High profits of successful investment projects were not shared with the lenders. The losses incurred in failed investments was passed on to the state to clean up. This is being witnessed in India today as increasing NPAs and the clamour for debt write-offs. 
  • This is the process of "riskless capitalism” , the former RBI  Governor Raghuram Rajan was alluding.

CONCLUSION
  • The promoter enjoys riskless capitalism even in these times of very slow growth, how many large promoters have lost their homes or have had to curb their lifestyles despite offering personal guarantees to lenders? Who pays for this one way bet large promoters enjoy? Clearly, the hard working savers and taxpayers of this country! As just one measure, the total write-offs of loans made by the commercial banks in the last five years is Rs. 1,61,018 crore, which is 1.27% of GDP ... Raghuram Rajan in 1994
  • The first boom was triggered by export surge accompanied by public sector bank lending, debt inflows and low real interest rates. The second boom was a result of a more reckless lending by the public sector banks in the face of interest rate hikes by the RBI. Such a “riskless capitalism” could not have thrived without the support, active or otherwise, of the state.
  • The second boom was short-lived because of the unstable nature of this growth rate as well as a rise in the domestic real rate of interest from 2010-11 due to RBI’s efforts towards inflation targeting. The effect of this increase in the domestic interest rate was muted because international borrowing costs got lowered due to monetary easing in the US in the aftermath of the global economic crisis.
  • While the cost of domestic credit increased, its international counterpart declined causing a change in the composition of corporate credit in favour of higher external commercial borrowings. With increase in domestic interest rates, the growth rate fell on the unstable path. The economy eventually hit the lower constraint implies debt defaults, which manifested in the large-scale accumulation of NPAs of the PSBs.
  • Faced with an asymmetry of power, banks are tempted to cave in and take the unfair deal the borrower offers with massive haircuts. The banks debt becomes junior debt and the promoters equity becomes super equity.