India-China border standoff

A series of disputes resulting in an armed confrontation between China and India would roil international markets, exacerbate fears in other Asian capitals about Chinese assertiveness, and distract Beijing and New Delhi from constructive agendas of economic development. The resulting setbacks to the Chinese and Indian economies could potentially harm U.S. investors, retailers, manufacturers, and service providers. The US has a major interest in peaceful relations between China and India, two largest countries by population and its trading and diplomatic partners.

• The Prime Minister Indira Gandhi openly asserted at the press conference on October 7 (1966) that India was committed to protect Bhutan.
• Bhutan and China do not have formal relations but maintain contact through their missions in Delhi.
• India and Bhutan has 'friendship treaty 2007' which states that 'neither government shall allow its territories for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other'. 
• In 1966, according to a China's report - the Dongnan (Donglang) grassland (referred to as ‘Doklam pasture’ by the Indian side) where the Indian government alleged that Chinese ‘intrusions’ had taken place is located in the vicinity of the tri-junction of the boundaries of China, Bhutan and Sikkim and has always been under Chinese jurisdiction and Chinese herdsmen have grazed there for generations.
• On the night of June 8, 2017, China initiated manoeuvre in Doklam that would trigger a chain of events leading to the most dangerous standoff between India and China in recent years. A platoon of China's PLA have moved stealthily into the plateau and razed stone bunkers built by Royal Bhutan Army years ago and manned occasionally. In doing so China made a premeditated move to alter the status quo that prevailed for decades in a sensitive region. 
• Ob June 16, 2017, the PLA road construction party entered Doklam and was initially cautioned by a Bhutanese Army patrol. Later when they failed to stop them, the Indian soldiers in the vicinity arrived to help the Bhutanese to deter the PLA from bulldozing its road construction through territory claimed both by China and Bhutan. Both India and China have strengthened their presence in the area, deploying around 3,000 troops each. This is the first time India has confronted the PLA on third country soil in Bhutan. 
• China accuse India of reneging and demanding Indian soldiers retract from the confrontation at Doklam by withdrawing first if any dialogue is to follow. Beijing has put itself in a corner leaving it no wriggle room or a face-saving option. As events have shown, India will not budge as the stakes are too high for it to blink first. Being locked in the valley also poses risks for the PLA.
• Every year, China and India claim hundreds of incursions by the other across the line that separates them in the Himalayan region; over time, forces on both sides have developed signals to warn the other and avoid deadly clashes. 
• The month-long standoff between the Indian army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Doklam sector of Bhutan, has become the longest ever. A border clash could inflict dozens of casualties, jolt global markets and hurt regional economic growth.  
• It is unlikely the current stand-off will escalate into a shooting match at Doklam as China would suffer much greater losses than the Indian troops. Doklam is the culmination of the cumulated angst of the Chinese over India’s constant needling and challenging of Beijing over its obduracy in blocking India’s admission in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, sanctioning Jaish-e-Mohammad’s Masood Azhar as a UN designated global terrorist and refusal on clarification of Line of Actual Control (LAC). India’s rejection of Belt and Road initiative, especially the strong objection to China Pakistan Economic Corridor on grounds of sovereignty which was endorsed by the US has angered China. 
• It is also possible that with China’s infrastructure industries having almost completely run out of orders, and the military having large budgets to spend, the road had been proposed to the military command in Tibet by one of China’s powerfully-connected construction companies to refill its thinning order books.
• The Three Gorges Dam project was not a grand central project, but the brainchild of a private company owned and managed by the family of Li Peng, the former prime minister of the country. The same company, the Three Gorges Dam company, is now asking Beijing to let it build a 40,000 MW hydropower project on the big bend north of Arunachal Pradesh, where the Brahmaputra drops 3,000 metres over a few kilometres.
• The rapid deterioration in China-India relations in the past two years, Beijing must have seen in the road project a way to provoke Modi into making a serious mistake while also putting pressure on the Bhutan-India relationship –  thereby increasing India’s isolation within South Asia.
• China did not anticipate Bhutan and India would respond in unison. All the conditions that had led to India’s crushing, humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962 have recreated themselves. We once more have an army unprepared for battle, whose capabilities are being exaggerated.
• This time, China has accused Indian border troops of trespassing into Chinese territory on June 18 and asked New Delhi to withdraw its troops from the Donglang area as a precondition for a “meaningful dialogue” to resolve the issue. Arun Jaitley said that the statement from Bhutan makes it clear that the land in question belongs to them.
• The 1962 war was set off by what was essentially an accident – the failure of army general headquarters to inform the soldiers tasked with setting up forward posts in North-East Frontier Agency that the Chinese had rejected the new tri-junction. As a result, Captain Mahesh Prasad, who set up the Dhola post at what he thought was the tri-junction, was soon surrounded by 600 Chinese soldiers. The attempt to relieve Dhola by force set off the war.
• Most Indian analysts who have been asked whether the present confrontation could lead to war have hastened to say ‘no’. That is precisely the wishful thinking that preceded the 1962 war. 
• China’s conditionality that Indian troops must withdraw first for any dialogue to start can be softened by employing the principle of simultaneity. As has happenend in the past, both sides can withdraw together from Doklam and prevent the dispute escalating into a bigger conflict.
• India's BJP led government is likely to take a tougher line and has already irritated Beijing on related issues. Its hawkish Prime Minister Modi—facing domestic pressures to retaliate, aiming to avoid the strategic consequences of showing weakness to Pakistan, and having developed punitive military-strike options short of full-scale ground mobilization—is more likely to respond with force than his predecessors.
• Today, Modi is faced to admit that he has made a mistake, pull Indian troops back from the Doklam plateau and step back. If he does not, then China has made it absolutely clear that it will use force to evict the Indians from Doklam. What is worse, the hostilities will take place on Bhutanese territory over the objections of its leaders and people.
• A wise leader is one who knows when to back off gracefully from an untenable position. A statesman is one who can not only do this but turn the situation around and make it work in his or her country’s favour. Regrettably Modi has so far shown neither wisdom nor statesmanship. But the Chinese don’t want a war with India. So there is still a little time left to make a start.

In war, there are no winners but all are losers ... Neville Chamberlain

It is well known that in war, the first casualty is truth. During any war 

truth is forsaken for propaganda ... Harry Browne

Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace and those who could 

make a good peace would never have won the war ... Winston Churchill

My View:

If India and China do have a war, nobody can win and it does not matter who has more guns or ships or aircraft. China might suffer higher causalities due to deficient logistical support. The fact is that the spoils of war would be impossible to bear, and given the billion-plus populations and taking care of them, even the victor would be destroyed. 1962 was a political war and badly handled. It will not happen again. Beijing is well aware of that. Even 1971 Indo-Pak war that was victorious and politically left Indira Gandhi on very strong footing proved economically destructive especially after 1973 oil crisis that led to economic unrest and eventually ended up with Emergency in 1977. During past decade India virtually dismantled all its small industries and became huge importer Chinese cheaper goods and disruption of these imported goods will effect our economy and operations. China also would suffer its economy further sinking with loss of over $60 billion exports to India. Wars are fought always between egoistic politicians rather than peoples of these two nations or their armies, who will pay the price for no fault of theirs.